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International IP law is an increasingly complex web
of international treaties
 IP-specific treaties (e.g., Berne, TRIPS)
 Trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA)
 Other treaties, including human rights treaties (e.g., the
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights)



The are concerns about effective enforcement of
international IP obligations
 Enforcement mechanisms in the TRIPS Agreement, trade
agreements, investor-state disputes
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Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada
 An investor-state dispute under NAFTA (Notice of Arbitration,
Sep. 12, 2013)
 A number of important issues
 Are patent application and maintenance fees an “investment”

under NAFTA?
 What degree of flexibility do countries enjoy as they design the
utility requirement of patentability within the TRIPS Agreement
framework?


Should private parties (as opposed to countries/
governments) be able to enforce international IP law?
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Traditional understanding of international IP law
 It is based on IP treaties
 The treaties govern the relationships among countries
 Any obligations imposed by the treaties are directed primarily at

governments
 The enforcement of obligations stemming from the treaties is in
the hands of governments or, with their consent, overseen by
international or regional organizations (e.g., WTO, ECJ)


Traditional understanding of the role that private parties
play in the enforcement of international IP law
 Individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations
 Private parties typically are not expected to have standing and a

cause of action to enforce international IP law
 Private parties contribute to the enforcement of international IP
law indirectly (e.g., by relying on national law, if it should be
consistent with and interpreted in light of international IP law)
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“Private Party Enforcement” of International IP Law
 The definition for the purposes of this paper

 An act by a private (non-governmental) person or entity

through which the person or entity relies directly on
international IP norms in a dispute against a governmental
or non-governmental actor
 Such an act of enforcement may consist of an action in a
national court, an international court, or an arbitration
tribunal
 A matter of existence of both standing (an available venue)

and a cause of action
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Existing Private Party Enforcement I
 In International Courts
 Human rights treaties
 In Arbitration Tribunals

 Investor-state disputes
 Arbitration proceedings between private parties using “general

principles of international commercial law”

6



Existing Private Party Enforcement II
 In National Courts I
 Self-executing provisions of international IP treaties

(provisions with direct effect)
 E.g., in the United States, the General Inter-American
Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection
 E.g., in Portugal, TRIPS Article 33
 In the European Union:
 Direct applicability of EU regulations
 Vertical direct effect of some provisions of the EU Treaties

and of some provisions of EU directives
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Existing Private Party Enforcement II
 In National Courts II
 Interpretation of national law consistent with international

obligations
 Potential indirect enforcement through the public policy filter

in choice of law and the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments
 In regional courts in matters of regional IP rights (e.g., ECJ

for EC trademarks, the Unified Patent Court for the EU
unitary patent)
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Arguments in favor of allowing private parties to pursue
claims against countries, based on the countries’
international obligations
 An increase in countries’ compliance with their international

obligations (emphasizing the legitimacy of international law)
 An increase of access to justice for persons and entities
irrespective of their own government’s stance
 An increase in consistency of interpretation of the
international obligations (if actions are centralized before a
single body, thus avoiding fragmentation)
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Arguments against allowing private parties to pursue
claims against countries, based on the countries’
international obligations
 A lack of possibility for countries to make strategic

decisions about when to tolerate a certain degree of
noncompliance and when to pursue enforcement actions
(i.e., a loss of discretion)
 An increase in consistency of interpretation of the
international obligations (if actions are centralized before a
single body) potentially resulting in limitation of flexibilities
 A further proliferation of courts and tribunals potentially
leading to inconsistent interpretations of international law
by various courts and tribunals
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Effects of the possibility of private party enforcement
on negotiations of international IP treaties
 Greater power to the executives negotiating the treaties:

Because the legislatures are more likely to accept and/or
ratify what the executives have negotiated, private party
enforcement reinforces the position of the executives
 Specificity of international treaty provisions: If private party
enforcement of treaties is a permissible concept, treaty
negotiators might employ one of the following negotiating
tactics:
 1) propose treaty provisions that are specific enough to
allow private parties to enforce the treaties; or
 2) propose treaty provisions that are vague enough to
preclude private party enforcement
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Greater reliance by society on IP will result in an increase in
the intersection of IP issues with the fundamental rights and
freedoms.



The greater the intersection of IP with the fundamental rights
and freedoms, the greater the emphasis will be on the private
party enforcement of international IP law.



Any consideration of the possibility of private party
enforcement of international IP law should include issues
pertaining to both the holders of IP rights and to holders of
competing rights, particularly if further IP treaties on rights and
limitations are concluded in new treaties (such as the
Marrakesh Treaty).
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